Forces should look for any history of badal in their areas and seek to informally facilitate their resolution. If a resolution under Sharia exists, then that should be pursued as the more supreme authority. Under the Hanafi Madhhab, a local custom including Pashtunwali, that violates the Hadith would have to subordinate itself accordingly if there is an alternative under Sharia. The challenge would obviously be that this subordination is dependent on local knowledge of the Hadith and its appropriate application.
The isolation of Omar al-Mukhtar, among the most charismatic of the Libyan mujhaideen leaders, represents not only the final phase of the Libyan resistance to Italy, but also a phase that isolated the Libyan populace from their Italian occupiers. The Italian strategy, in late 1930, was to cut off Mukhtar from his people, and his tribe. They accomplished this partly by placing a good portion of the Jebel al-Akhdar (Green Mountain) region (Libya’s north eastern region bordering Egypt), and its villages in concentration camps. So effective were the concentration camps that livestock depleted, from 1/3 million heads in 1910, to under 140,000 heads in 1933. The concentration camps, though tactically effective, caused the death of thousands of Libyan families, who were nomadic and not used to confinement. It served to cause long-term alienation, and was seared not only in Libya’s collective memory, but the Arab world as a whole. The Italians placed logistical centers in the open desert to attract guerillas and entice them to attack bringing them out in the open for a rapid reaction force that included air support. The Italians also built a 300 kilometer wire along the Egyptian-Libyan border from the coast in Bordiyah to the oasis town of Jaghbub. The Graziani Line was reinforced with three central defense forts, six smaller outposts, and the line had three airstrips dedicated to it with four planes each. It took over 8,000 troops to man the line, with 200 trucks and 2,500 laborers to build and maintain the fence.